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RENT CONTROL AS A MUNICIPAL
FUNCTION IN FLORIDA
In 1969 the City Council of the City of Miami Beach enacted a
rent control ordinance for certain specific types of housing, in order
to correct an inflationary spiral and housing shortage. The ordinance
empowered the City Rent Agency to establish maximum rents, make
decreases in rent where appropriate, and determine which housing
was exempt from the regulation. Several lessors filed a complaint
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court held the
ordinance invalid.2
Three questions faced the Supreme Court of Florida in City of
Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc.3 (1) did the city have the
right or authority to enact a rent control ordinance? (2) did the city
have the authority to enact an ordinance delegating such wide discre-
tion to the City Rent Agency? (3) did the ordinance conflict with
any State law?4
Generally, the legislative powers of municipalities are of a limited
nature.5 Municipalities have no inherent right of self-government
beyond that granted them by the state,0 and municipalities' power
to legislate is governed by a variety of fundamental rules. First, the
1. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1791, Housing and Rent Control Regula-
tions, October 15, 1969. The ordinance provided for rent regulation in all hous-
ing with four or more rental units except for hospitals, nursing homes, asylums
or public institutions, college or school dormitories or other charitable or edu-
cational or non-profit institutions, hotels, motels, public housing, condominiums
and any housing completed after December 1, 1969. The ordinance also required
the City Rent Agency to determine the rents, set aside rents if needed, and make
appropriate decreases.
2. City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Motel, Inc., 33 Fla. Supp. 192 (Cir. Ct.
1972).
3. 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
4. For the purposes of this comment, discussion of the third issue has been
omitted. The court found that the ordinance conflicted with FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
83.03, 83.04, 83.06, 83.20 (Supp. 1973). The court discussed the issue only in
passing and it was not necessary to do more in light of the holding on the first
two issues.
5. 56 Abr. JUR. 2d Municipal Corporations § 125 (1971).
6. Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d
195 (1935).
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laws of a city must conform to its charter; the charter is to the city
what the constitution is to the state.7 Second, a city cannot pass laws
in conflict with state laws.8 Third, legislation must relate to "munic-
ipal concerns." 9
Traditionally, the grant of power to municipalities has been re-
stricted to police powers, that is, matters of public health, safety,
morals and general welfare. The delegation of police powers to
municipalities has been held to not necessarily include the power to
regulate rents.10 For example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has
held that a conferral by the state in 1947 of rent control power and
its subsequent withdrawal in 1956 indicated that such a power could
be conferred only directly by the state.1
The ordinary presumption of validity that attaches to regularly
enacted ordinances will not suffice to allow courts to uphold an ordi-
nance based on a power not inferrable from the police powers,'12 but
some courts have found rent control ordinances valid if they are of
a temporary nature 3 and have been enacted to ease a public emer-
gency." Such a public emergency has been defined in strict terms by
the Supreme Court to embrace a situation caused by "an insufficient
supply of dwelling houses and apartments, so grave that it constituted
a serious menance to the health, morality, comfort, and even to the
peace of a large part of the people ...."15 It would seem, therefore,
that municipal control of rents is warranted only during emergencies
and then only when such ordinances are of a temporary nature.
7. 5 E. MOQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 15.19 (1969).
8. 56 A.r. JUR. 2d Municipal Corporations § 361 (1971); 5 E. McQULLmN,
supra note 7, § 15.20.
9. 5 E. MCQuILLIN, supra note 7, § 15.18.
10. Old Colony Gardens, Inc., v. City of Stamford, 147 Conn. 60, 156 A.2d
515 (1959).
11. Id.
12. Wagner v. Mayor of the City of Newark, 24 N.J. 467, 478, 132 A.2d 794,
800 (1937).
13, See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Burton v. City of Hartford,
144 Conn. 80, 127 A.2d 251 (1956); Lincoln Bldg. Associates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d
413, 420, 135 N.E.2d 801, 806, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 639 (1956); Warren v. City
ot Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 362, 366, 127 A.2d 703, 705 (1956).
14. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Kress, Dunlap & Lane, Ltd. v.
Downing, 193 F. Supp. 874 (D. Virgin IsI. 1961); Lincoln Bldg. Associates v.
Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 135 N.E.2d 801, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956); Warren v. City
of Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 362, 127 A.2d 703 (1956).
15. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 245 (1922).
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The City of Miami Beach receives its power to legislate from the
Florida constitution, which requires all cities to adopt or draft mu-
nicipal charters.' 6 The constitution provides that "municipalities shall
have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them
to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and
render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal
purposes except as otherwise provided by law.' 7 Thus, it would
seem that municipalities in Florida can exercise their legislative
powers only with respect to purely municipal functions, that is,
those functions "granted for the specific benefit and advantage
of the urban community embraced within the corporate bound-
aries."' 8 This is made even clearer by the legislature's response to the
Florida Constitutional Revision Commission's recommendations in
1968. In enacting the current provisions the legislature deleted the
proposed words "municipalities shall have the power of self-govern-
ment."' 9
Florida decisions regarding municipal exercise of legislative power
follow the general rules set forth earlier. City of Miami v. Girtman2
held that the governing body of a city is entitled to exercise its police
power in favor of the general welfare, and where such exercise is
valid, personal as well as property rights must yield. Such an ordi-
nance, however, must not infringe unnecessarily on protected con-
stitutional rights, nor be inconsistent with general state laws.21 "Ordi-
nances must be reasonable, equal and impartial in operation," 22 but
once properly enacted, an ordinance acquires a presumption of
validity.23 Because of this presumption, Florida courts have shown a
16. FA. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
17. Id.
18. Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 438, 134 So. 205, 208 (1931).
The Miami Beach Charter adopts the police power language. CHARTER 01 THE
CITY OF iAmi BEACH § 6(x) (1915).
19. FLA. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (commentary).
20. 104 So. 2d 62, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
21. Id. at 66; Miami Shores Village v. American Legion, 156 Fla. 673, 678,
24 So. 2d 33, 35 (1945); Blitch v. City of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 615, 195 So. 406,
407 (1940).
22. City of Wilton Manors v. Starling, 121 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
23. City of Miami Beach v. Texas Co., 141 Fla. 616, 637, 194 So. 368, 377
(1940).
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reluctance to declare municipal ordinances invalid.24 Due to the
limitations placed on a municipality's power to legislate, however,
all ordinances are subject to judicial review.25
Florida courts closely scrutinize ordinances that materially curtail
the use of property. If no valid public safety, health, or moral pur-
poses are involved, the power to enact such ordinances "will not
ordinarily be inferred from general welfare powers ...particularly
when kindred or similar powers are not expressly conferred, and have
not been customarily exercised pursuant to general powers relating
to the public welfare.-- Indeed, if any doubt arises during a court's
inspection of an ordinance as to the municipality's authority to enact
such an ordinance, such doubt should be resolved by the court against
the municipality.2 7
Based on these principles, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
the ordinance challenged in Fleetwood was constitutionally invalid.28
First, the ordinance sought to interfere with a basic property relation-
ship, that of landlord-tenant2 9 Second, the court doubted whether a
sufficient public emergency, as defined by the Supreme Court in Levy
Leasing Co. v. Siegel,13 existed.3 1 Third, rent regulation did not offer
a sufficient framework by which to determine when the housing
shortage would be over. The court found that such an absence of a
time table or other indicators effectively made rent control permanent
in Miami Beach,- 2 a proposition directly contrary to the rule that rent
control ordinances must be temporary only.33 Based on these deter-
minations, the court chose to invalidate the ordinance. In so deciding,
the court also reached the second issue, whether the municipality had
the authority to delegate such wide powers to the City Rent Agency.
24. City of Wilton Manors v. Starling, 121 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
25. City of Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 683, 10 So. 2d 307, 309 (1942).
26. State v. Fowler, 90 Fla. 155, 159, 105 So. 733, 734 (1925).
27. City of Daytona Beach v. Dygert, 146 Fla. 352, 357, 1 So. 2d 170, 172
(1941).
28. 261 So. 2d at 801.
29. Id. at 804.
30. 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
31. 261 So. 2d at 804, 805.
32. Id. at 805.




There is no doubt that a municipality has some discretion in its
choice of methods for implementing an ordinance. There are limits,
however, on the extent and nature of this discretion. One obvious
limit is good faith and reason.34 Also, the powers delegated to agencies
must be "so dearly defined, so limited in scope, that nothing is left
to the unbridled discretion or whim of the administrative agency
charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Act."3r, The holding
of the court in Amara v. Town of Daytona Beach Shores30 regarding
the licensing of businesses is pertinent in this instance to delegating
the power to control rents. That court held that even if the licensing
of business could be classified as promoting health, safety, or the
general welfare, it was necessary that the specifications be fixed in the
ordinance with such certainty that the granting or denial of a license
not be left to the whims of an administrative agency.37
The ordinance in the Fleetwood case sought to empower the City
Rent Agency to exempt certain housing when the agency believed
those tenants did not need protection.38 The only guidelines for the
agency were that it consider the "equities of the matter."' 30 Such an
imprecise direction clearly did not meet the rule that objective guide-
lines and standards should expressly appear in the act or be reason-
ably inferred.40 The court had no choice but to find the delegation
to be too imprecise.
The holdings in Fleetwood that a city cannot enact a permanent
rent control ordinance and that they cannot delegate such broad
powers to an agency without sufficient standards to guide the agency,
have particular importance to the urban planner. Rent control at
the local level could be a powerful tool which, when used judiciously,
could help remedy problems such as blight, decay and numerous
other housing problems. Fleetwood suggests municipalities have no
authority to control rent, absent special circumstances. Municipalities
have limited rent control authority during emergencies but that
seems to defeat the very purpose of rent control-the avoidance of
34. State v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 56 Fla. 858, 47 So. 358 (1908).
35. Mahon v. County of Sarasota, 177 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1965).
36. 181 So. 2d 722, 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
37. Id.
38. 261 So. 2d at 805.
39. Id.
40. Smith v. Portante, 212 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1968).
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future problems by controlling rent now. Fleetwood also suggests
how not to delegate power to an agency. Specific guidelines should
be laid down and standards imposed on an agency before courts will
approve such delegations. Finally, the most important ramification of
the Fleetwood decision is that in taking such a strong stand regarding
the scope of police powers, the court retards future efforts by munici-
palities to correct a serious urban problem.
Ray Dickhaner
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